1. Rashto, the Hijab and Chastity Plan of the Amr Be Marouf Headquarters: Based on the statistics provided by the authors of this policy package,* it can be said that this society is bipolar on the issue of compulsory hijab. And then they proposed conflicting solutions that aim to control people against people and result in deepening the social divide and the loss of trust among the masses.
2. If you look at the numbers that the same report brought from the ISPA survey, 58.5 percent of people disagreed with the statement that a person can be Muslim but not wear a hijab. This means that 41.5 percent of people did not disagree. (Statistically, 40 percent of the population is significant. Sample size from the ISPA website)
3. Note that the ISPA survey did not report anything about what percentage of society these people consider to be Muslim. This means that the result of this question, even for 58.5 percent, is not that they think society should be veiled. Or thaispa.ir/Default/Detail…nforced as a law.
4. Several tweets can be made about the statistics presented and cherry-picking the results of the project. - Cherry-picking means, just like cherry-picking, announcing statistics that are not suffen.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cherry_pi…irm our opinion:
5. But let's return to the solutions presented in this plan. Including cash fines and extending cash fines to colleagues and heads of households, and creating social/financial deprivation for those around them. But before that, let's state a fact about Iranian society.
6. Social capital trends show that Iranian society is a bipolar society in macro trust indicators. The closer the high to low trust column is to 100, the more bipolar the society is. This was 93 and 95. Most of the indicators fell and more institutions came close to 100.
7. But these same movements showed, at least until the mid-1990s, that the indicators of micro-trust, i.e. people's trust in people, were in a good state in Iran. What was Iran's social capital was the micro-level relationships between people. Decreasing macro-trust paves the way for a new regime, but! Decreasing micro-trust /
8. The decline in micro-trust causes society to lose its ability to maintain its collective identity. -Examples of societies that cannot accept national identity as a collective identity are Congo and Afghanistan - In these conditions, even a dictatoriaejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.11…ble. Here are other dimensions:
9. But it's not just countries with extreme conditions that are the problem. For example, see the relationship between polink.springer.com/article/10.100…t in a country like Chile here:
10. This policy package proposes to use restraint on the people for the people. In such a way that those around the criminal must pay the price (colleagues, the head of the department, etc.). In addition to being highly debatable from a legal perspective - at least for several hundred years, humanity has been trying to limit punishment to the act and the individual -
11. Institutionally and socially, the goal it will achieve is to create conflict between people and deepen the social divide. And that is in a situation where 1. society itself is a bipolar issue, and 2. society in general is facing a crisis of trust and is bipolar.
12. The financial penalty for not wearing a hijab (which is itself quite debatable) is a much less important issue compared to the proposed arrangements for increasing the social gap in this plan. P.S. This comment does not in any way endorse the other parts of this plan, and it is just that not taking it very seriously is a side effect of pitting people against people.